



ONE—BUT NOT THE SAME1 
 




What kinds of changes can a human being undergo without thereby becoming 
someone different? Someone can lose an arm, for example, and after this change she will 
continue to exist, with physical characteristics that are different from those she had 
before. But what if you lose all your memories, or have your entire brain or body 
replaced, or suddenly acquire a radically different personality? Is the person who exists 
after changes like these a different person entirely than the one who existed before them? 
Judgments about these matters are complicated by the fact that phrases like “same 
person” and “different person” have multiple uses in ordinary English. If, for example, 
your good friend has just returned from a life-changing semester abroad, you might say 
of her that 
 
(1) She’s not the same person I used to know.  
 
But “same person” means something quite different in (1) than it would mean if, after 
you encountered John on Tuesday and his identical twin Joe the day after, their mother 
Alice were to tell you that 
 
(2) The person you saw on Wednesday is not the same person you saw the day 
before. 
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and compensation for experimental participants was provided by the Tufts University Center for Cognitive 
Studies. Author contributions were distributed as follows, according to the CRediT taxonomy 
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If (1)-type and (2)-type ways of using “same person” can come apart from one another, 
then we need to get clear on which use is in play in any given case before we can 
understand what is being talked about. 
How can we achieve this clarity? In real-life conversation, contextual cues usually 
suffice, and thus there is no prospect of misunderstanding what is meant in cases like the 
ones described just above. But philosophical contexts can make for ambiguity that may 
be harder to resolve. Suppose a man goes off to war, where he suffers a brain injury that 
corrupts his memory and changes his personality dramatically. And now let us ask: Is the 
man who returns home the same person as the man who left? In a sense of that phrase, 
we are quite prepared to say he is not. But what if that is not the sense of that phrase that 
interests us? What way do we have of asking whether the man returning home is the same 
person as the man who left, in the same sense of “same person” that Alice uses to say, in 
(2) above, that John is not the same person as his twin? 
For those with training in philosophy, the task is fairly easy. In statements like 
(1), we say in philosophy, the word “same” expresses a concept of qualitative identity or 
difference—and in the context at issue they are often ways of characterizing similarity or 
difference in personality or self-understanding (“identity” in one colloquial sense), which 
is why we can also use this language to say of two close friends that they are “practically 
the same person”.2 By contrast, in a statement like (2) the concept expressed by the 
phrase “same person” is that of numerical identity or difference—the thing at stake in 
philosophical disputes over the rationality of concern for our future selves (Parfit 1984), 
the relevance of memory to personal continuity (Locke 1975; Reid 2002; Nichols 2017; 
Swinburne 2019, ch. 3), the possibility of surviving one’s death (Baker 2005; Nichols et. 
al. 2018) or being “transferred” into an entirely different body (Williams 1970), and the 
proper characterization of transformative decisions (Paul 2014, 2020; Molouki and 
Bartels 2017; Molouki et al. 2020) and radical changes in personality or moral values 
(Searle 2005; Strohminger and Nichols 2015; Prinz and Nichols 2016; Earp, Latham, and 
	
2 We will return at the end of this paper to consider whether qualitative identity or difference is the 




Tobia 2020). It’s this concept, we say, i.e. that of being numerically the same person, that 
we mean to elicit in our question about the man returned from war. 
But it is hard to take this approach in posing philosophical questions to those 
without prior mastery of this specialized terminology. As anyone who has tried teaching 
the topic of personal identity to beginning students can likely attest, questions of the form 
“Is this person numerically the same …?” always ring hollow at first, and even after their 
meaning has been explained a bit of Socratic probing reveals that opposing 
interpretations of the phrase “same person”, frequently accompanied by a conception of 
“identity” as something that can be lost, acquired, altered, or discovered, are never very 
far from the surface. Whether the context is that of an examination, a casual conversation, 
or an attempt to discern commonsense “intuitions” about matters of philosophical 
interest, in order to know that they are thinking about the things we mean to be at issue, 
one needs to ensure that the distinctions being drawn are connected to the appropriate 
conceptual category. 
Here is a way of doing this, inspired by experience in the classroom and explored 
recently in the work of Vincent Descombes (2016). Outside philosophy, the most 
common way to express our concept of a person’s numerical identity is through the 
connected use of proper names, definite descriptions, and the personal pronouns “I”, 
“you”, “he”, and “she”. Thus one might say, following Thomas Reid (2002, p. 276), of a 
certain man that he was flogged when a boy at school, for robbing an orchard; that later 
on he took a standard from the enemy in his first campaign; and that he was then made a 
general in advanced life. Perhaps this story does not settle whether the man was the 
“same person” in advanced life as in boyhood, where that phrase is used in the sense it 
has in (1) above. It does, however, commit us to thinking that there is someone who falls 
under all the descriptions here given, and that it is this (one, selfsame) person whom the 
entire story is about. In using a single pronoun to refer to the man under each of our three 
descriptions, we have thereby described him as (“numerically”) identical across them. 
As we indicated above, this proposal is relevant to the work of psychologists and 
philosophers who wish to probe commonsense intuitions about the conditions of personal 
identity over time (e.g. Nichols and Bruno 2010; Strohminger and Nichols 2014, 2015; 




2018; Earp et al. 2019; Earp, Latham, and Tobia 2020). Such research has frequently 
identified surprising effects of normative considerations on identity judgments: for 
example, Tobia (2015) found that people were more inclined to say that someone had 
remained the same person if their moral character improved than if they became morally 
worse, while Strohminger and Nichols (2014) found that deterioration in a person’s moral 
character had a larger influence on identity judgments than did other kinds of radical 
psychological changes such as extinction of their memories or desires. This work has 
been criticized, however, for failing to distinguish judgments of numerical identity from 
judgments of merely qualitative similarity and difference (Berniūnas and Dranseika 2016; 
Dranseika 2017; Starmans and Bloom 2018). In what follows we present the results of 
two pre registered studies3 that together serve to validate this criticism, while also 




 In his (2015) study, Tobia investigated folk concepts of personal identity by 
presenting participants with one of two variants on the story of Phineas Gage: 
 
Phineas is extremely [kind / cruel]; he really enjoys [helping / harming] people. 
He is also employed as a railroad worker. One day at work, a railroad explosion 
causes a large iron spike to fly out and into his head, and he is immediately taken 
for emergency surgery. The doctors manage to remove the iron spike and their 
patient is fortunate to survive. However, in some ways this man after the accident 
is remarkably different from Phineas before the accident. Phineas before the 
accident was extremely [kind / cruel] and enjoyed [helping / harming] people, but 
the man after the accident is now extremely [cruel / kind]; he even enjoys 
[harming / helping] people. (Tobia 2015, p. 397) 
 
	





Here, the text in brackets marks the difference between two conditions: one of moral 
IMPROVEMENT, in which Phineas changes from a cruel person who enjoys harming 
people to a kind person who enjoys helping them; and one of moral DETERIORATION, in 
which the change is from kindness to cruelty instead. Tobia’s interest was in seeing 
whether these differences made a difference in judgments of the protagonist’s diachronic 
identity. To this end, following the vignette Tobia’s participants read a brief paragraph 
whose purpose was “[t]o engage participants with the relevant notion of numerical 
identity” (ibid.): 
 
Art and Bart disagree over what happened in this story. Art thinks that Phineas 
before the accident and the man after the accident are different in some respects 
but are still the same person. To Art, it seems like one person (Phineas) 
experienced some changes. Bart disagrees. He thinks that after the accident, the 
original man named Phineas does not exist anymore; the man after the accident is 
a different person. To Bart, it seems like one person died (Phineas before the 
accident), and it is really a different person entirely that exists after the accident 
(the man after the accident). (Tobia 2015, 397-398) 
 
Participants were then asked to indicate whether they agreed more with Art or with Bart 
about what had happened. And these judgments were significantly affected by direction 
of change, as participants agreed more with Bart in the condition of moral 
DETERIORATION than that of moral IMPROVEMENT. 
But did Tobia’s clarificatory paragraph have the intended effect? His disputants’ 
repeated talk of “same person” and “different person” in expressing their views provides 
some reason to doubt this, given the common use of these phrases to express concepts of 
qualitative identity and the naturalness of considering the dispute in this light. And while 
the character of Bart uses phrases like “does not exist” and “different person entirely” in 
an attempt to clarify the stakes, it’s possible to read this talk as metaphor or hyperbole. A 
person reading the paragraph above could very well think that Bart is right in some 
important sense in what he says about what happened in the story, without believing that 
the man after the accident is a different person than the man before it in the same sense 




To explore this matter, we presented participants (n = 301: 44% male, mean year 
of birth = 1996), recruited from the online platform Prolific, with a vignette that was 
identical to Tobia’s save for its opening sentence: 
 
Phineas grew up in Brooklyn. He is extremely [kind / cruel] ... 
 
Following this vignette, our participants read a clarificatory paragraph identical to 
Tobia’s, summarizing the imaginary debate between Art and Bart. As in Tobia’s study, 
the bracketed text above marks the differences between two conditions, one of moral 
DETERIORATION and one of moral IMPROVEMENT. Following the vignette and 
clarificatory paragraph, all participants responded to each of the following prompts: 
 
(A) Please indicate whether you agree more with Art or with Bart about what 
happened in this story. [7-point scale ranging from “I agree strongly with Art” to 
“I agree strongly with Bart”.] 
(B) Other than Art and Bart and the doctors, how many people are described in this 
story? [Forced-choice between “1”, “2”, “3”, and “More than 3”.] 
(C) Please indicate your agreement with the following statements about the person 
who exists after the accident: 
(i) He was born in Brooklyn. [7-point scale ranging from “Strongly agree” 
to “Strongly disagree”.] 
(ii) He was originally extremely [kind / cruel], and then was in an accident 
that made him become extremely [cruel / kind]. [7-point scale ranging 
from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree”.] 
 
The last three prompts were intended to engage a concept of numerical identity in the 
manner outlined in our opening section: the question in (B) did so by inviting participants 
simply to count the number of people described in the vignette, and the statements under 
(C) did so by inviting them to consider whether there was a basis for attributing Phineas’s 
upbringing, and the entire series of moral characteristics described in the vignette, to the  




from Tobia’s original experiment. We predicted that we would observe an effect of 
direction of change (IMPROVEMENT vs. DETERIORATION) on responses to (A), but not on 
responses to (B) and (C).4 
In this study our three prompts were always displayed in the order shown above, 
while the order of statements (i) and (ii) under (C) was randomized. Each prompt was 
shown on a separate page with the vignette and clarificatory paragraph above it, and 
participants were not able to return to a previous page of the survey once they had 
completed it. Following an a priori decision, we excluded 33 participants from the final 
analysis for choosing “3” or “More than 3” as the answer to (B), on the grounds that the 
only sensible responses to this vignette were to think either that the person after the 
accident was numerically the same person as Phineas, in which case the answer would be 
“1”, or that he was numerically a different person, in which case the answer would be 
“2”.5 As a result of this exclusion, prompt (B) was effectively a binary choice question, 
and so we analyzed it according to the proportion of participants who had answered “1” 
rather than “2”. 
The results of the study were in line with our predictions. A two-way analysis of 
variance revealed a highly significant main effect of direction of change on responses to 
prompt (A), such that participants agreed more with Bart in the condition of moral 
DETERIORATION (M = 3.32, SD = 1.87) than in the condition of moral IMPROVEMENT (M 
= 2.65, SD = 1.54).6 However, we found no effect of direction of change on responses to 
(B) and (C), which were essentially identical between our two conditions. Regardless of 
whether the person who existed after the accident had an improved or worsened moral 
	
4 We realized only after completing the study that there was an error in our wording of the statement in 
(Ci): while the vignette begins by saying that Phineas grew up in Brooklyn, this statement says instead that 
he was born there. A post hoc analysis revealed that overall agreement with the statement in (Ci), M = 2.21, 
SD = 1.53, was significantly lower than overall agreement with the statement in (Cii), M = 1.61, SD = 0.94: 
t(267) < .001. However, this difference is immaterial to our argument, since as we explain just below there 
was no effect of direction of change on agreement with either of the two statements, and this last thing is 
what our predictions all concerned. A similar point applies to prompt (B) in our Study 2. 
5 Notably, this exclusion did not affect our results: a post hoc analysis including all participants who 
finished the survey found a significant effect of direction of change on ratings of (A), F(1,289) = 12.2, p < 
.0001, but no significant effect of condition on ratings of the other prompts: for (B), X2(3,291) = 1.052, p = 
.789; for (Ci), F(1,289) = 0.216, p = .643; for (Cii), F(1,289) = 0.014, p = .903. 
6 F(1,266) = 10.31, p = .002, d = .39. For comparison, in the corresponding experiment in Tobia 
(2015), the mean response on an identical 7-point scale (1 = Strongly Agree With Art; 7 = Strongly Agree 





character, participants agreed overwhelmingly that our vignette described a stretch in the 
life of one person,7 born in Brooklyn,8 and that he had been in an accident that led to a 
radical change in his moral character.9 In neither case, then, did our participants view the 
person after the accident as a numerically different person from the original Phineas. 
 
 
Figure 1. Summary of responses to prompts (A), (B), (Ci), and (Cii) in Experiment 1 
with standard error bars (final n = 268). 
 
The results of this experiment are visualized in Figure 1. While they replicated 
Tobia’s (2015) finding of an effect of direction of change on agreement with the 
disputants in his clarificatory paragraph, they also support the hypothesis that this 
paragraph failed to ensure that his participants employed a concept of purely numerical 
identity in evaluating the positions described, as no such effect was found in responses to 
our prompts (B) and (C). Radical changes in moral character, whether for the better or for 
the worse, did not lead participants to question the numerical identity of the person after 
the accident with Phineas before it, as expressed in responses to the latter prompts. 
Across both conditions, our participants consistently judged that there was just one 
person, other than Art and Bart and the doctors, who was described in this vignette, and 
	
7 Prompt (B): 93.1% of participants answered “1” in the condition of moral IMPROVEMENT and 
92.0% answered “1” in the condition of moral DETERIORATION: X2(1,268) = 0.016, p = .898. 
8 Prompt (Ci): in the condition of moral IMPROVEMENT, M = 2.29, SD = 1.52; in the condition of 
moral DETERIORATION, M = 2.14, SD = 1.55: F(1,266) = 0.653, p = .42. 
9 Prompt (Cii): in the condition of moral IMPROVEMENT, M = 1.58, SD = 0.99; in the condition of 




they consistently described the person after the accident as having the same birthplace as 





Our second experiment extended these findings by applying the same 
methodology within a slightly different paradigm. In Study 1 of their (2014) paper, 
Strohminger and Nichols presented participants with the following scenario: 
 
Jim is an accountant living in Chicago. One day, he sustains a severe head injury 
from a car accident. His only chance for survival is participation in an advanced 
medical experiment called a Type 2 transplant procedure. It is the year 2049 and 
scientists are able to grow different parts of the brain if they become damaged. A 
stock of brain tissue is kept cryogenically frozen to be used as spare parts in the 
event of an emergency. In a Type 2 transplant procedure, a team of doctors 
removes the damaged parts of the brain and carefully replaces it with the stock 
brain tissue. The damaged brain tissue is destroyed after it has been removed. 
After the operation, all the right neural connections between the old brain and the 
replacement brain tissue have been made. The doctors test all physiological 
responses and determine that the patient is alive and functioning. The doctors scan 
the brain of the transplant recipient and run some standard psychological tests. 
 
Strohminger and Nichols’s vignette then concluded with one of several possible 
descriptions of the condition of the transplant recipient after the surgery. Here we will 
focus on the following three: 
 
UNCHANGED They [viz., the doctors] discover that the transplant recipient thinks and 





MORALITY They [viz., the doctors] discover that the transplant recipient has 
lost his moral conscience—he is no longer capable of judging right from wrong, 
or being moved by the suffering of others. Aside from this, he thinks and acts the 
same way as before the accident. 
 
MEMORY They [viz., the doctors] discover that the transplant recipient has 
lost his memories—he can no longer remember anything that happened before the 
accident. Aside from this, he thinks and acts the same way as before the accident. 
 
Following the vignette, participants in this study indicated their agreement with the 
statement that “After the surgery, the transplant recipient is still Jim”. And Strohminger 
and Nichols found significant effects of condition on agreement with this statement, such 
that mean agreement with it was significantly lower in the MORALITY condition than the 
MEMORY condition, and significantly lower in both these conditions than in the condition 
in which Jim was psychologically UNCHANGED. 
Yet like the phrase “same person”, the description of someone as being or not 
being “still so-and-so” does not unambiguously express a concept of numerical personal 
identity. The question arises, therefore, whether participants who denied that the person 
after the transplant was (“still”) Jim meant the same sort of thing one might mean in 
saying, for example, that the chair of one’s department is not (“still”) Professor Marques. 
To explore this question we presented a second group of participants (n = 183: 45% male, 
mean year of birth = 1996), recruited from the online platform Prolific, with a vignette 
that began as follows: 
 
Jim is an accountant who grew up in Chicago. One day, he sustains a severe head 
injury ... 
 
The vignette continued in the same way as the original vignette used by Strohminger and 





UNCHANGED They [viz., the doctors] discover that the transplant recipient thinks 
and acts the same way as Jim did before the accident. 
 
MORALITY They [viz., the doctors] discover that the transplant recipient has no 
moral conscience—he is not capable of judging right from wrong, or being moved 
by the suffering of others. Aside from this, he thinks and acts the same way as Jim 
did before the accident. 
 
MEMORY They [viz., the doctors] discover that the transplant recipient has no 
memories—he cannot longer remember anything that happened before the 
accident. Aside from this, he thinks and acts the same way as Jim did before the 
accident. 
 
The small differences between our MORAL and MEMORY conditions and those used by 
Strohminger and Nichols served only to counter any implication that the transplant 
recipient was numerically the same person as the original Jim. While their transplant 
recipient had lost his moral conscience or memories, was no longer capable of judging 
right from wrong or remembering anything that had happened to him, and otherwise was 
just as he had been before the accident (where all these descriptions imply that the 
recipient had existed beforehand as a person with similar or different characteristics), our 
patient simply didn’t have a moral conscience or memories, simply was not capable of 
judging morally or remembering the past, and was otherwise the same as Jim had 
previously been. As such, these vignettes were better suited than the originals to elicit 
unbiased judgments of the numerical non-identity of Jim and the transplant recipient. 






(A) Please indicate your agreement with the following statement about the 
transplant recipient after the surgery: He is still Jim.  [7-point scale ranging 
from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree”.] 
(B) Please indicate your agreement with the following statement about the 
transplant recipient after the surgery: He was born in Chicago.  [7-point scale 
ranging from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree”.] 
(C) Other than the doctors, how many people are described in the story you 
just read? [Forced-choice between “1”, “2”, “3”, and “More than 3”.] 
 
Each participant viewed all three prompts, with (A) and (B) displayed first in a 
counterbalanced order, followed by (C). As with Experiment 1, we followed an a priori 
decision to exclude 12 participants for choosing “3” or “More than 3” as the answer to 
(C).10 As a result of this exclusion, prompt (C) was effectively a binary choice question, 
and so we analyzed it according to the proportion of participants who had chosen “1” 
rather than “2”. We predicted that we would observe an effect of direction of condition 
(MORAL vs. MEMORY vs. UNCHANGED) in responses to (A), but not in responses to (B) or 
(C). 
The results of this experiment were in line with our predictions. A three-way 
analysis of variance revealed a highly significant main effect of condition on responses to 
(A), such that participants agreed more with the statement in (A) in the UNCHANGED 
condition (M = 1.93, SD = 1.07) than the condition of erased MEMORY (M = 2.73, SD = 
1.56), and agreed with it least of all in the condition of MORAL impairment (M = 3.22, SD 
= 1.81).11 Planned pairwise analyses revealed that responses to (A) were significantly 
different between the UNCHANGED condition and the MORAL condition12 and between the 
	
10 Once again, this exclusion did not affect our results: a post hoc analysis including all participants 
who finished the survey found a significant main effect of direction of change on responses to (A), 
F(2,180) = 10.45, p < .0001, but no significant effect of condition on responses to the other prompts: for 
(B), F(2,180) = 0.811, p = .446; for (C), X2(6,183) = 4.140, p = .658. 
11 F(2,168) = 10.7, p < .001. For comparison, in the corresponding experiment in Strohminger and 
Nichols (2014), the mean responses on an identical 7-point scale (1 = Strongly Agree; 7 = Strongly 
Disagree) were 2.34 (SD = 1.43) in the UNCHANGED condition, 3.68 (SD = 1.72) in the MEMORY 
condition, and 4.77 (SD = 2.03) in the MORALITY condition. We thank Nina Strohminger for providing 
us with these statistics. 




UNCHANGED condition and the MEMORY condition,13 while the difference in responses to 
(A) between the MORAL condition and the MEMORY condition was statistically 
nonsignificant14 but trended toward statistical significance in the same direction as 
Strohminger and Nichols’s original (2014) finding.15 By contrast, we found no effect of 
condition on responses to (B) and (C), which were essentially identical between our three 
conditions. Regardless of the psychological state of the transplant recipient after the 
surgery, participants agreed overwhelmingly that our vignette described a stretch in the 
life of one person,16 born in Chicago.17 In neither case, then, was there any evidence that 
our participants viewed the person after the accident as numerically different from the 
original Jim, nor did these judgments differ between our three conditions. 
These results are visualized in Figure 2. While they largely replicated 
Strohminger and Nichols’s (2014, Study 1) finding of the effect of condition on 
participants’ evaluation of whether the transplant recipient after the surgery was “still 
Jim”, they also provide strong evidence that participants were not interpreting this 
statement as expressing a concept of purely numerical identity, since our participants 
responded to prompts (B) and (C) in the same way when the transplant recipient was 
psychologically unchanged as when he had lost his memory or moral conscience. Even 
when the recipient of the Type II transplant had no memories or moral conscience after 
the surgery, participants consistently read the vignette as describing a stretch in the life of 
just one person, born in Chicago and then, in some cases, significantly transformed in the 
wake of an accident. 
	
13 F(1,110) = 10.01, p = .002, d = .60 
14 F(1,112) = 2.414, p = .123, d = .29 
15 Since our primary interest was not in the pattern of responses to question (A) we were not troubled 
by this lack of a statistically significant difference, but will pause to emphasize that failure to replicate a 
previously observed effect with a p-value of less than .05 does not amount to a non-replication of that 
earlier finding. While our observed effect size of d = .29 for the comparison between the MORAL and 
MEMORY conditions was smaller than the effect size of d = .58 observed by Strohminger and Nichols it 
was still not negligible, and there is no reason to see one or the other of these as the “true” size of the effect 
in question. (We thank Nina Strohminger for providing us with this last statistic.) Once there are further 
replications of these experiments, researchers should examine how many samples’ confidence intervals fall 
outside the range of the population effect size, rather than how many p-values are below a given threshold 
of statistical significance (Cumming 2014). 
16 Statement (C): 86.0% of participants answered “1” in the UNCHANGED condition, 93.2% 
answered “1” in the MORALITY condition, and 90.9% answered “1” in the MEMORY condition: 
X2(2,171) = 1.77, p = .413. 
17 Statement (B): in the UNCHANGED condition, M = 1.23, SD = 0.80; in the MORALITY condition, 






Figure 2. Summary of responses to prompts (A), (B), and (C) in Experiment 2 with 





If phrases like “the same person”, “the same man”, and “still so-and-so” don’t 
always engage a concept of numerical identity, then what other concept or concepts do 
we use these words to express? To this point we have followed Dranseika (2017; cf. 
Berniūnas and Dranseika 2016) and Starmans and Bloom (2018) in assuming that it is the 
concept of qualitative psychological similarity or sameness in personality, but there are 
other views on offer. For example, a large body of work (e.g. Newman, Bloom, and 
Knobe 2013; Newman, De Freitas, and Knobe 2015; Strohminger, Knobe, and Newman 
2017; De Frietas et. al., 2018) has analyzed the concept of a “true self” as a moralized 
conception of a person’s individual essence, while Descombes (2016) links ordinary talk 
of “who I am” to the concept of identity as something that is defined by a person’s own 
self-understanding, and Knobe (in prep.) suggests that talk of who a person is may 
express a “dual character concept” that can be employed either descriptively or in a 
normatively laden way, as when we speak of who someone is truly or ultimately. A yet 




into play is a function of conversational context. Nothing in our findings helps to decide 
between these different views. 
Our findings do, however, suggest a promising strategy for the experimental study 
of how philosophically important concepts are employed by people without formal 
philosophical training. As we noted above, in philosophy we use phrases like “numerical 
identity” and “qualitative identity” in a somewhat artificial way, in order thereby to 
disambiguate between the different meanings a phrase like “same person” can have in 
ordinary language. But we cannot easily disambiguate things in this way when we wish 
to investigate how these concepts are understood by non-philosophers: for a question like 
“Is the man after the accident numerically the same as the man before?” cannot be posed 
to such a person without first explicating the meaning of the italicized phrase. 
The clarificatory paragraph in Tobia (2015) was an attempt to provide this sort of 
explication. As we have shown, however, the paragraph simply did not have the intended 
effect. Yet our results suggest that the best way to address this deficiency is not by 
attempting further explication of the terms of an imaginary philosophical debate. What’s 
required instead is to probe participants’ judgments with a greater variety of measures, 
informed by reflective sensitivity to the different ways that philosophically important 
concepts find expression in ordinary language. We hope that further work will extend this 
methodology further, by developing diverse measures and rigorously assessing their 
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